We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria. 1
Introduction
In the situations of strategic interactions modelled in Game Theory, the goal of each player is essentially the maximisation of her own expected payoff. Players, however, often care not only about maximising their own expectation, but also about influencing other players' expected outcomes. As an example, consider a number of competing investment banks selling and buying tradable assets so that the trading of financial products affects each other's profit. These banks might randomize their choices and obviously aim at maximizing their expected profit. Still, their strategy might go beyond the choice of a specific investment and they might be interested in influencing the market and the behavior of other banks possibly undermining the expected gain of their competitors.
In this work, we offer logical models to formalize these kinds of strategic interactions, called Expectation Games, where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations over an outcome as well as their own expectation. Expectation Games are an extension of Łukasiewicz games [9] and are based on the logics E(G) that formalise reasoning about expected payoffs in a class of Łukasiewicz games [4] . Łukasiewicz games [9] , a generalisation of Boolean games [7] , involve a finite set of players P i each controlling a finite set of propositional variables V i , whose strategy corresponds to assigning values from the scale
k , 1 to the variables in V i . Strategies can be interpreted as efforts or costs, and each player's strategic choice can be seen as an assignment to each controlled variable carrying an intrinsic cost. Each player is given a finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic formula ϕ i , with variables from n i V i , whose valuation is interpreted as the payoff function for P i and corresponds to the restriction over L k of a continuous piecewise linear polynomial function [2] .
Expectation Games expand Lukasiewicz games by assigning to each player P i a modal formula Φ i of the logic E(G), whose interpretation corresponds to a piecewise rational polynomial function whose variables are interpreted as the expected values of the payoff functions ϕ i . Each formula Φ i is then meant to represent a player's goal concerning the relation between her and other players' expectations.
Logical Background
The language of Łukasiewicz logic Ł (see [2] ) is built from a countable set of propositional variables {p 1 , p 2 , . . .}, the binary connective → and the truth constant 0 (for falsity). Further connectives are defined as follows: 
A valuation e satisfies a formula ϕ if e(ϕ) = 1. As usual, a set of formulas is called a theory. A valuation e satisfies a theory T , if e(ψ) = 1, for every ψ ∈ T .
Infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic has the following axiomatisation:
The only inference rule is modus ponens, i.e.: from ϕ → ψ and ϕ derive ψ.
A proof in Ł is a sequence ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n of formulas such that each ϕ i either is an axiom of Ł or follows from some preceding ϕ j , ϕ k ( j, k < i) by modus ponens. We say that a formula ϕ can be derived from a theory T , denoted as T ⊢ ϕ, if there is a proof of ϕ from a set T ′ ⊆ T . A theory T is said to be consistent if T ⊢ 0.
Łukasiewicz logic is complete with respect to deductions from finite theories for the given semantics, i.e.: for every finite theory T and every formula ϕ, T ⊢ ϕ iff every valuation e that satisfies T also satisfies ϕ.
For each k ∈ N, the finite-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł k is the schematic extension of Ł with the axiom schemas:
. . , n− 2 that does not divide n− 1, and where nϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ ⊕ · · ·⊕ ϕ (n times) and ϕ k is an abbreviation for ϕ& . . . &ϕ, (k times). The notions of valuation and satisfiability for Ł k are defined as above just replacing [0, 1] by
as set of truth values. Every Ł k is complete (in the above sense) with respect to deductions from finite theories for the given semantics. It is sometimes useful to introduce constants in addition to 0 that will denote values in the domain L k . Specifically, we will denote by Ł c k the Łukasiewicz logic obtained by adding constants c for every value c ∈ L k . We assume that valuation functions e interpret such constants in the natural way: e(c) = c. 
k , the functions defined by a formula are combinations of restrictions of McNaughton functions and, in addition, the constant functions for each c ∈ L k . The class of functions definable by Ł c k -formulas exactly coincides with the class of all functions f :
The expressive power of infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic lies in, and is limited to, the definability of piecewise linear polynomial functions. Expanding Ł with the connectives ⊙, → Π of Product logic [6] , interpreted as the product of reals and as the truncated division, respectively, significantly augments the expressive power of the logic. The ŁΠ 
Notice that the presence of the constant 1 2 makes it possible to define constants for all rationals in [0, 1] (see [3] ). ŁΠ 1 2 's axioms include the axioms of Łukasiewicz and Product logics (see [6] ) as well as the following additional axioms, where ∆ϕ is ¬ϕ → Π 0:
The deduction rules are modus ponens for & and →, and the necessitation rule for ∆, i.e.: from ϕ derive ∆ϕ. ŁΠ 1 2 is complete with respect to deductions from finite theories for the given semantics [3] . While Ł is the logic of McNaughton functions, ŁΠ 1 2 is the logic of piecewise rational functions over [0, 1] n , for all n (see [10] ). In fact, the function defined by each ŁΠ 1 2 -formula with n variables corresponds to a supremum of rational fractions where P(x 1 , . . . , x n ), Q(x 1 , . . . , x n ) are polynomials with rational coefficients. Conversely, every piecewise rational function with over the unit cube [0, 1] n can be defined by an ŁΠ 
Logics for Łukasiewicz Games with Expectations
In this section we briefly introduce Łukasiewicz games on Ł c k along with the logics E(G) to represent expected payoffs in classes of games. E(G) will be the basis upon which Expectation Games are defined.
Łukasiewicz Games Definition ([9]) A Łukasiewicz game G on Ł c
k is a tuple G = P, V, {V i }, {S i }, {ϕ i } where: 1. P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a set of players; 
For each i
to the payoff function of P i , and whose value is determined by the valuations in {S 1 , . . . , S n }.
We denote by S = S 1 × · · · × S n the product of the strategy spaces. A tuple s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S of strategies is called a strategy combination. With an abuse of notation, we denote by f ϕ i ( s) the value of the payoff function f ϕ i under the valuation corresponding to the strategy combination s.
Given a game G , let δ : P → {1, . . . , m} be a function assigning to each player P i an integer from {1, . . . , m} that corresponds to the number of variables in V i : i.e.: δ (P i ) = m i . δ is called a variable distribution function. Given a game G , the type of G is the triple n, m, δ , where n is the number of players, m is the number of variables in V, and δ is the variable distribution function for G . 
Notice that what matters in the definition of a type is not which players are assigned certain variables, but rather their distribution.
Let G be a Łukasiewicz game on Ł c k . A mixed strategy π i for player P i is a probability distribution on the strategy space S i . By π −i , we denote the tuple of mixed strategies (π 1 , . . . , π i−1 , π i+1 , . . . , π n ). P −i denotes the tuple of players (P 1 , . . . , P i−1 , P i+1 , . . . , P n ). Given the mixed strategies (π 1 , . . . , π n ), the expected payoff for P i of playing π i , when P −i play π −i , is given by
The Logics E(G)
Given a class of games G on Ł c k , the language of E(G) is defined as follows: (1) The set NModF of nonmodal formulas corresponds to the set of Ł c k -formulas built from the propositional variables p 1 , . . . , p m . (2) The set ModF of modal formulas is built from the atomic modal formulas Eϕ, with ϕ ∈ NModF, using the connectives of the ŁΠ 1 2 logic. Eϕ is meant to encode a player's expected payoff of playing a mixed strategy, given the payoff function associated to ϕ. Nested modalities are not allowed.
A model M for E(G) is a tuple S, e, {π i } , such that:
1. S = S 1 × · · · × S n is the set of all strategy combinations, i.e.
(1) ϕ 1 := p 1 and ϕ 2 := p 2 , and (2) Φ 1 := ¬d(E(p 1 ), E(p 2 )) and
The above game can be regarded as a particular version of Matching Pennies with expectations. In fact, while P 1 aims at matching P 2 's expectation, P 2 wants their expectations to be as far as possible. It is easy to see that there is no model M that gives an equilibrium for E G . Therefore: Recall that the first-order theory Th(R) of real closed fields is the set of sentences in the language of ordered rings +, −, ·, 0, 1, < that are valid over the field of reals [8] . The existence of an equilibrium in a game E G can be expressed through a first-order sentence ξ of Th(R):
Proposition 5.2 For each Expectation Game E G there exists a first-order sentence ξ of the theory Th(R) of real closed fields so that E G admits a Nash Equilibrium if and only if ξ holds in Th(R).
As a consequence of the above, it is easy to see that a game E G admits an equilibrium if and only if there exists a quantifier-free formula in the language of ordered rings that defines a non-empty semialgebraic set over the reals [8] .
We exploit the connection with Th(R) to determine the computational complexity of both the MEM-BERSHIP and the NON-EMPTINESS problem. In fact, given a game E G , it can be shown that the sentence ξ can be computed from E G but its length is exponential in the number of propositional variables of the payoff formulas φ i . Deciding the validity of a sentence in Th(R) is singly exponential in the number of variables and doubly exponential in the number of alternations of quantifier blocks [5] . It can be shown that for every game the alternation of quantifiers in ξ is always fixed. As a consequence, we obtain: Theorem 5.3 Given an Expectation Game E G the NON-EMPTINESS problem can be decided in 2-EXPTIME.
Deciding the validity of a sentence with only existential quantifiers in Th(R) can be solved in PSPACE [1] . We can show that, given a game E G and model M with rational mixed strategies (π 1 , . . . , π n ), we can compute in polynomial time an existential sentence of Th(R) whose validity is equivalent to the fact that M is an equilibrium model.
Theorem 5.4 Given an Expectation
Game E G and a model M with rational mixed strategies (π 1 , . . . , π n ), the MEMBERSHIP problem can be decided in PSPACE.
Extensions and Future Work
This work lends itself to several extensions and generalizations. On the one hand we plan to study the notion of correlated equilibria for Expectation Games as well as to determine the complexity of checking their existence. In addition, we are interested in studying games where an external agent can exert influence on the game by imposing constraints on the payoffs and the expectations. This agent would then play the role of an enforcer by pushing the players to make choices that agree with her dispositions. Also, we plan to investigate games based on infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic [2] where players have infinite strategy spaces. Finally, we intend to explore possible relations with stochastic games and whether our framework can be adapted to formalize those kinds of strategic interactions.
